Dear Tom:

I imagine that ever since the first group of men picked up clubs against another group, we have had a certain form of maggot within our ranks who murders his leaders. I have been unable to find any statistics at all on this topic. It seems to be "the hate that dare not speak its name."

As a young, impressionable Marine, I heard two stories from the WW II types of such crimes. One staff sergeant captured at Corrigidor, told of group of enlisted Marines who hung a lieutenant colonel in the hole of a POW ship because he was not equitable in the distribution of the food give them by the Japs. Another told me of a lieutenant who "chickened" out under fire and lay trembling in a fighting hole. A Marine placed an armed hand grenade in the hole with him, and they moved out.

I'm sure there were other cases. I'm sure it happened in most, if not all wars, in all armies - this horrible phenomenon of the criminal-led killing their leaders.

But the war which brought this activity to a terrible high was the war in Viet Nam. Again, I can find no statistics. I can speak only from my own observations and from the first-hand reports from that war.

There is the story of the first sergeant who was firm and demanding. He was not interested in winning the hearts and minds of his troops, just as long as they did what he told them to do. From what I could gather, he was fair, but very unrelenting in his high standards. He came into his tent, got un- dressed, reclined on his cot, and died when a claymore mine placed under this cot was detonated by a disgruntled trooper.

The big talk among troops in their bullshit sessions was the "prices" on the heads of various officers and Staff NCOs. I overheard such a conversation one evening at Phu Loc when I served as the communications officer. The troops explained to me that the Grunts in the battalion had funds for payment to the martre who would terminate the lives of various people in leadership capacities. These "prices" went as high as $15,000.

I'm sure this was just so much talk, as I never found anything in our battalion which would lend any credibility to such theory.

By the way, probably the best compliment I ever got from those troopers was when I asked this kid, "Good God! Bounties on officers and Staff NCOs. What the hell is the price on my head?"

He responded in an offhanded manner, "Oh about thirty-five cents."

I was sitting in the officers mess at 1st Tank Battalion having breakfast. There was the unmistakable sound of a hand grenade explosion outside the mess hall. Running out to find the source, I found First Lieutenant Pat Campbell, his driver and another Marine lying just outside the door to the company office. They had been "fragged." None were killed, fortunately. In his pain Pat managed to answer quick questions I asked him about any suspected unhappy troops who might have done this. But he wasn't of any great help.

Later that morning l met one of the sharpest investigators I've ever known. A young staff sergeant came from the division CID, began gathering facts, interrogating witnesses, and by 1400 that afternoon, arrested the bum who had thrown the grenade. He was one of Pat's troopers who was unhappy with some decision Pat had made which affected him.

Over a couple of cold beers that afternoon, I had a conversation with the investigator. I asked him if such a thing was rare. He told me that this particular case was one of six he was currently investigating, and he was not the only investigator assigned to "fraggings."

The culprit in this case managed to cop a plea. In exchange for his guilty plea, he was given seven years at hard labor. In my humble opinion, therein lies the root of the frigging fraggings and other problems. He should have been taken out and shot!

I'm not going to go into a diatribe on our polluted judicial system - not yet. But the light sentences given this and other crimes causes the trooper to figure the odds, get his nerve, and another fragging occurs.

The real misfortune of the fragging, however, was the timidity it bred in a large percentage of officers and non-commissioned officers, and anyone who would believe that this is not so - that it did not negatively affect the performance of duty, the decisions made by a great number of Marine Corps leaders - would believe that Billy Carter doesn't want a beer.

The consideration of such an eventuality was only natural. We all knew that we had a great number of unmitigated gangsters in the Marine Corps, and that these bums were capable of anything, including murder. So we thought about it, and any officer or NCO who didn't (or who won't admit it) needs to have his GCT reevaluated. The threat was real. There were instances where you had to be placed in conflict with the actions of your troopers, and the bums were generally in conflict because they were bums.

One evening I had to awaken another officer. He was sleeping with a .45 pistol in his hand. I asked him about this seemingly unnecessary habit and made a comment about, "I'm your headquarters commandant. I'm not going to let the zips slip up on you in your hootch."

His response was disheartening, "I'm not afraid of the zips. I'm afraid of the troops."

This situation could have been used as a good training vehicle in teaching leaders to handle fear. It was unrealistic to refuse to admit the threat existed, but it was not the party line to discuss it. So, it wasn't discussed. We lived with it. I had the fear, and I would like to open my soul and find out really how many decisions I made which were influenced by that fear. I like to think that there was no influence on my decisions, but I'm not so naive as to say such is decidedly the case.

We had a kid in Tank Battalion who went "berserk" one night and ran about the cantonment throwing M-26 grenades. Luckily he had left the safety pin, the one used in shipping and storage, on the spoons of the grenades, but he was pulling the main safety pins, throwing the grenades, and running about with impunity. Forgive the bragging, but after futile attempts at getting help, I finally (with the reluctant help of one other officer) managed to get the situation under control. This bum was tried, convicted and given a couple of months in the brig. During that chase I wanted to shoot that son of a bitch bad, but my fear of the consequences of killing the bastard were greater than my other fears. At one point I had a bead on him with my pistol, but the officer with me gave the welcomed suggestion that we try other methods.

The morale of this story is that a number of Marine Corps leaders were confronted with the fear of their lives from other troopers, and many failed the test. They did not recognize the fear, admit it, and make it work for them rather than against them.

The solution to the "fragging" problem in future wars is quite simple, yet impossible due to our judicial system. But the culprit should be publicly shot, and shot immediately - within minutes of a determination that he is the guilty party. The bleeding-heart who say that such punishment is not a deterent, don't know Marines. The knowledge that such punishment is guaranteed would deter a bunch of these maggots who figure the odds.

I'm going to close with a quote of the late General George S. Patton, Jr., written in his book War As I Knew It. He said, "One of the great defects in our military establishment is the giving of weak sentences for military offenses. The purpose of military law is administrative rather than legal... In justice to other men, soldiers who go to sleep on post, who go absent for an unreasonable time during combat, who shirk battle, should be executed; and Army and Corps commanders should have the authority to approve the death sentence. It is utterly stupid to say that General Officers, as a result of whose orders thousands of gallant and brave men have been killed, are not capable of knowing how to remove the life of one poltroon."