My research interests are in Law and Economics and the Theory of Contracts. The former concerns the implications of the law on various incentives; the latter explains the mechanisms principals (i.e. contract designers) employ when faced with various contracting problems such as asymmetric information (adverse selection) and hidden action (moral hazard). I am interested in the role asymmetric information plays in the filing of suits, litigation, and settlement, as well as optimal contract design and enforcement. In my research, I have looked at problems of enforcement (the imperfect and costly legal battle, for example), information gathering, and auditing choice (more often or more accurate?). I also have research in public economics suggesting the inclusion of moral sentiment values, such as altruism, desires for justice and equity, in benefit cost analysis.

Publications

“Inducing Inaccurate Audits to Commit to the Audit Policy,” (with Dongsoo Shin), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25, 2007.

"An Aggregate Measure for Benefit Cost Analysis," (with R. Zerbe and Y. Bauman), Ecological Economics, 2006. Also available at AEI-Brookings Joint Center.

"A Preference for an Aggregate Measure: A Reply to Sagoff," (with R. Zerbe and Y. Bauman) Ecological Economics, 2006.

"Relying on Information Acquired by a Principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23, June 2005.

Working Papers and Current Research

Contracts in the Shadow of the Law: Optimal Litigation Strategies in Organizations under review.

“Disregarding the Attorney's Advice,” (w/Dongsoo Shin) under review.

“Investigation and Settlement of Suits with Negative Expected Value,” working paper.

“When Good Isn’t Enough: R&D Task Selection with Uncertain Project Returns,” work in progress.